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I. INTRODUCTION
For the past two decades, the Soviet Union has oriented its naval policy toward
the production of a large scale and formidable submarine force.' Particularly, in the last
ten years there has been a mass production of various Soviet Nuclear Attack,
submarines which can launch cruise missiles and/or torpedoes from over-the-horizon
against surface vessels. In view of this, the United States has placed great emphasis in
the direction of Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW). Specifically, acoustical hydrophone
sensors (sonobuoys and towed-arrays) have been developed to detect submarine
frequency signatures that are associated with specific submarine hulls. It is with this
information, that an ASW tactician can localize and track a potential threat submarine
and attack if necessary.
It takes years of experience to become an expert in ASW. One such person is an
Antisubmarine Warfare Commander (ASWC). He possesses an in-depth knowledge of
the enemy's threat capabilities and the associated tactics needed to counter this threat
in a hostile environment. He also is aware of the limitations of his own assets (surface
and airborne) with respect to what they can or can not do. Armed with this basic
foundation of knowledge, an ASWC developes his approach to solving an ASW
problem. Therefore, his ability to make precise decisions based upon his years of
experience is a very important element in any ASW problem; as his decision can
influence the outcome of an ASW scenario and ultimately the survivability of a carrier
battle group.
To describe such an individual is extremely difficult because the human
decision-making process is a very complex system. Each individual perceives problems
differently and their course of action to solve a given problem may be totally different
as compared to someone else. Decision-making can also be difficult due to the lack of
accurate information which can easily lead to uncertainty. This becomes an important
issue especially when a decision-maker must choose from a list of alternatives that are
vague in nature. This is a common occurance for an ASWC. The received acoustical
information may be inaccurate due to unresolved bearing ambiguity or merely
irregularities that are inherent with sound propagation traveling in the ocean.
Therefore, modeling an ASWC decision-maker is an arduous task that must encompass
a variety of human characteristic traits.
One attempt to model an ASWC decision-maker has been accomplished by
ALPHATECH, INC. Utilizing the discrete Kalman filter, they have mathematically
modeled an ASW tracking scenario. Although, lacking in complexity, it does serve as a
basic model. To evaluate the models performance, US Naval Officers were utilized as
subjects to compare their results with those attained by the model. The assumption
being, that if the model's performance and the performance of the experimental
subjects were correlated, then it can be considered a valid representation of the
ASWC's decision-making process. Additionally, one other major issue, was to
determine if a simulation model possesses validity. This was judged by whether the
model represents a true representation of what is desired to be simulated. Specifically,
for an ASWC, the model must represent a real world operational environment.
Acknowledging this, the choice of this study was to discuss the ALPHATECH,
INC., ASWC simulation model. In doing so, their assessment scenario was analyzed
by looking into the parameters utilized to justify the models existence. Further, the
scenario is evaluated in order to determine if it is a true representation of an
operational environment. The model itself, is a good assessment; however, current
operational battle groups have better and more capable means of attaining acoustical
information then presented by their model. Therefore, using the experimental
parameters established by ALPHATECH, INC., an alternative scenario is provided
with a following discussion presenting some of the new sensor gathering equipment
available in the fleets today.
Lastly, the ASWC himself was analyzed. To accomplish this, the chosen
approach was to model a conceptual ASWC taking into consideration a real world
operational environment. This is done by examining several topics that influence his
thought process when making decisions. The complexity of this issue presents various
implications ranging from, for example, personnel problems to equipment
malfunctions. Each of which, whether alone or occuring simultaneously, do reflect
upon his decision-making process. Therefore, we identify why this sort of individual is
such a unique person and yet, he is the critical element and focal point in an ASW
confrontation.
II. THE ASW PROBLEM
The decisions required in an Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW) scenario are crucial
for the survival of naval vessels and the international rights to free passage of the open
oceans. In view of this major concern, research efforts attempting to build a
simulation model for an Antisubmarine Warfare Commander (ASWC) are of interest
to the Navy. The model should identify the decision process that an ASWC would
encounter in an ASW scenario. This is not an easy task, for there are endless variables
that may or may not be confronted in the overall decision analysis. In many
situations, the sequence of events rely solely on a previous decision. If a poor
judgement decision is rendered, the follow-on events can easily lead the scenario astray
and yield erroneous ASW results. However, prudent modeling will allow the decision
maker to correct for a bad decision (or guess) as the scenario developes.
ALPHATECH, INC., has devised a fundamental ASWC simulation. This model
currently addresses several tactical decisions confronted by an ASWC and outlines his
formulated thought process in various scenarios. Specifically, this cognitive model is
attempting to provide the following:
1. To identify the cognitive limitations or biases of the ASWC that most
significantly impacts the total, or overall, ASW system performance. These
results could be used to guide the development of the new training procedures
or decision support systems.
To evaluate more, reliably the effectiveness of future decision
t
suppojrt systems,
operational modifications, or tactical doctrine on total ASW system
performance by replacing primitive repn
available in extant large-scale simulations.
resentations of high-level commanders
'
3. To predict the impact of individual cognitive differences on the ASW system.
(Ref. 3:p. 1)
The model does not provide an ideal simulation, but does establish an initial
foundation upon which to build. For an ASWC model should serve as a tool to aid
and educate the trainee. In a rapidly growing technological society, there is always
need for improvement to a model to coincide with current technology or existing
equipment. To improve upon the ALPHATECH model and based on operational
experience, a realistic ASW scenario utilizing a US aircraft carrier battle group and a
generic Soviet submarine is provided in order to bring validity into the ASWC's
decision process. This scenario is based on knowledge of the Soviet submarine threat
and factors associated with the flow rate of information to the ASWC.
A. SOVIET SUBMARINE THREAT
The optimum scenario would indeed allow the ASWC to be alerted of the exact
location of an enemy submarine before it enters into the cruise missile range envelope
of our own naval forces. However, this is not a realistic assumption for past and
especially present ASW operations. History dictates that the subsurface threat has and
will in the future, present disruption in sea lines of communication. Recently, the
Chief of Naval Operations wrote the following with regard to anti-submarine warfare:
It will be essential to conduct forward operations with attack submarines, as well as
to establish barriers at key world chokepoints using maritime patrol aircraft, mines,
attack submarines, or sonobuoys, to prevent leakage of enemy forces to the open
ocean where the Western Alliance's resupply lines can be threatened. Maritime air
and anti-submarine warfare units will be involved, along with offensive and
defensive mining. As the battle groups move forward, we will wage an aggressive
campaign against all Soviet submarines, including ballistic missile submarines. This
aggressive action ensures that we prevent such fosses as the Germans inflicted on
allied shipping between January and July of 1942 when 14 of 50 then-operational
German U-boats sunk 450 ships. (Ref. l:p. 11)
The current generation of Soviet submarines has improved significantly with
respect to detection by acoustical sensors. These technological advancements have
brought the Soviets much closer with regard to difficulty of detection to that of the
United States submarines. This aspect alone, has caused the United States to expend a
tremendous amount of effort in attempts to combat this underwater threat.
Specifically, the Soviets have significantly decreased their submarine radiated energy
noise levels. This recent noise reduction has caused a major concern in the US Navy's
ASW attitude and posture. The Soviet threat exists and is real. The many years of
enjoying the tactical advantage of detecting noisy submarines is slowly dwindling.
Soviet made cruise missiles are extremely accurate and very lethal. Anti-surface
cruise missiles can be launched at targets from 30 to 300 nautical miles (nm). The
long-range cruise missiles generally must be fired from the surface and require
midcourse guidance from another ship, submarine, or aircraft. The short-range cruise
missiles (less than 100 nm) are fired while the submarine is submerged. These missiles
require no external guidance; the targets are located by the submarines own sonar (Ref.
2:p. 23). Possessing this capability, the combination of long range cruise missiles
coupled with submarine radiated noise reduction has certainly impacted the ASWC's
role in Naval Warfare.
10
B. INFORMATION FLOW
Without question, uncertain data and time late rate of received data flow increase
the anxieties and stress levels of the ASWC. In addition, acoustical information is not
and will not be in the foreseeable future, a refined science. For bearing ambiguity,
operator expertise or merely the human overload associated with the man/machine
interface, increases the level of the human "guess factor". Operator fatigue, verbal
telephone miscommunications (sound powered phones) or inexperienced personnel are
examples which add to the uncertainties which add to the ASWC's dilemma. Efforts to
specifically focus on education and/or training requirements is a problem area that the
Navy continuously strives to improve. However, uncertainty can only be suppressed
through continued rigorous fleet naval exercises and improving academic classroom
requirements.
Flow of information can easily be disrupted by machinery. Equipment
malfunction or improperly tuned avionics can severely degrade a ships ASW capability
or provide information which is not within normal operating parameters. Reliability of
hardware in a salt environment and the shipboard atmosphere together, complicate the
essential need to maintain equipment at its highest efficiency. For a salt environment
increases corrosion rate and shipboard vibrations and motion increase component
failure rate. However, age and wear-and-tear produces many questionable reliability
factors. We are in an era where standard everyday equipment is extremely
sophisticated. This degree of complexity, requires maintenance personnel to possess a
very strong technical background. This many times is not the case. For mechanical
failures can not be perceived and technical manuals do not address many solutions to
fix certain equipment. Additionally, spare parts are essential to perform routine
maintenance. It is all too frustrating to have necessary equipment not be in a
functional status for lack of parts. Occasionally, the absence of critical parts severely
degrades a units ability to respond in a time of crisis. Specifically, acoustical parts to
repair surface ship sonars and towed arrays, aviation parts to repair the onboard
helicopter so as to maintain flyable status and parts to repair internal equipment that
process raw acoustical data for operator display analysis. This is not an overnight
problem, but in some cases can last days, weeks or even months. It is only through
experience and knowledge of these variables, that the ASWC must understand the
abilities of his assets and place them where he will attain the highest tactical advantage.
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The question now becomes how does an ASWC cope with finding enemy
submarines if information flow is questionable and/or inaccurate? Knowing the
fundamentals of decision theory, as information flow increases, what sort of decision
process is encountered in order to ensure that the best solution is attained? These
questions certainly will not provide exact answers because there are endless scenarios
where different thought paths are needed. Therefore, to model such behavior is
extremely difficult, if in fact possible.
It must be assumed that the ASWC has surrounded himself with a high quality
and experienced staff. Each individual is an expert in his field and understands his
fellow shipmates professional expertise. Once achieved, most staff collected advice can
now be assumed to be fact or the best alternative to a decision. This is a rather bold
assumption, for many more times than desired, personnel filling a staff position, were
selected merely because. his new duty assignment coincided with a timely fit to fill such
a billet. However, billet assignment by maximizing resource management to get the
best people in the proper jobs is a separate issue unto itself.
C. SCENARIO
Succinctly, the ASWC's responsibility is to detect and to deter enemy submarines
using a variety of surface, subsurface, and airborne platforms (Ref. 3:p. 3). The
responsibility commences with the first piece of sensor or visual information.
Assuming a hostile environment, a current realistic fair assessment, would be to expect
first information to be achieved via acoustical sensor(s). The ASWC should be privy
to known subsurface threats operating in his local area. Therefore, how valid is this
first piece of information? The ASWC must consider and evaluate the following:
1. For the sensor that made initial contact, how much of a weighting factor can be
associated with the validity of its unknown contact? Specifically, the history
behind that sensor's false alarm probability.
2. Should the contact be considered valid if there are other sensors in the local
area which did or did not gain contact that correlates?
3. Was contact attained actively or passively?
4. Does the current acoustical water conditions support the detection of a
potential contact?
All of these questions need to be answered. In fact, a single piece of information only
provides an alertment to a potential contact. This alertment serves as the stimulus to
drive the ASWC into a potential ASW scenario.
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Generally, the unit possessing the sensor will try to reestablish a second piece of
contact information while maneuvering in its designated sector. It is extremely
important that the unit remains in its sector inorder to maintain the crucial ASW
integrity of the battle group. Once re-detection occurs and several acoustical sensor
inputs are received, the contact will be identified as a POS SUB (possible submarine).
The ASWC is now confronted with several options depending on the contact's bearing
with relation to the battle group's course and speed. The battle group commander will
undoubtedly vector the aircraft carrier and associated AAW (anti-aircraft warfare)
escorts away from the subsurface threat. This tactical maneuver will also account for
ensuring that the high value unit (aircraft carrier) is outside the envelope of the
limiting-lines-of-approach (LLOA) of the submarine. The LLOA are the vector lines
from the high value unit, for which a submarine must be within these prescribed vector
parameters, inorder to fire a torpedo warhead.
Torpedoes have a range of up to 30 nm. There are two types of torpedoes:
wire-guided torpedoes and acoustic sensing torpedoes. Wire-guided torpedoes feed
back acoustic information to the fire control operator for more precise mid-course
targeting. Acoustic sensing torpedoes are dispatched along the bearing determined
by the submarine's sonar, and use their own acoustic sensors to accurately seek the
target. (Ref. 2:p. 23)
It can be seen that the ASWC's thought process is beginning to formulate many
theoretical hypotheses. He is plagued with several critical decisions that require
immediate action. Battle group survivability can be solely dependent upon what
tactical measures are taken. Particularly, what ASW surface units should be dedicated
to investigate the POS SUB contact? By removing one or more surface assets, how has
this degraded the ASW protection from the main battle force? Should ASW
helicopters be launched? Will the aircraft carrier be able to provide additional ASW
airborne assets or is it unable to launch aircraft due to inadequate wind launch
conditions? The ASWC is swamped with decisions to be made while simultaneously
being flooded with past and current contact information. As more sensors acquire
contact and localization of the submarine is underway, the ASWC becomes saturated
with raw data. This saturation can and will reach levels approaching a severe overload
condition. Excessive overload is avoided with most ASWC's because all less pertinent
information is immediately filtered out or passed over and consumed by his operational
staff. This allows the ASWC to focus on relevant decisions while absorbing stall
recommendations for his prompt actions. However, it could increase his stress level if
he does not have confidence in the input from his staff.
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When the submarine contact is localized, classification can be an easy process
depending on what sensors are in contact. Specifically, passive sensors reveal a
frequency spectrum different from the local ambient environment. This stand out
frequency usually is related to that of a submarine's signature. An average to
experienced 'sensor operator can readily identify this acoustical signature. Through
gram analysis and experience, he should be able to quickly scan the associated
harmonics of the fundamental frequency and provide an accurate subsurface
classification to the ASWC.
The submarines area of probability (AOP) particularly, localization, can consume
time. As the AOP is sanitized with surface platforms or aircraft sonobuoys, refined
localization parameters can take hours. If localization parameters are favorable, the
ASWC must plan a strategy that will yield a high probability of kill. This attack mode
presents several decision making avenues that the ASWC must consider. He must
orient his weapon delivery unit into an envelope compatible to the weapon and that of
the submarine. Once achieved and weapon delivered, the ASWC is confronted with
other factors. In most cases, he can not immediately launch a second weapon due to
mutual homing interference which is currently inherent in existing torpedoes.
Therefore, he can only hope that the torpedo has acquired the submarine and is
seeking to destroy, or he must wait until the torpedo has exhausted its fuel before he
attempts a reattack. This time delay is critical and unfortunately can allow sufficient
evasive submarine maneuvers for escape. If escape occurs and contact is not regained,
it does not mean that the attack was unsuccessful because the ASWC has performed
his duties in not allowing the submarine to attack the battle group. It may indeed
prove only to be a postponement, but the current in extremis danger for the battle
group, is over.
There are numerous variables that can present obstructions in the ongoing saga
of ASW operations. The element of surprise is normally on the side of the subsurface
threat. This advantage can provide an opportunity for a submarine to initiate an
attack prior to detection by the surface battle group. Although the probability exists,
it must be assumed that proper ASW battle group sector screening integrity will
alleviate this potential occurance. The latest generation of Soviet submarine radiated
acoustic energy noise levels have been significantly reduced and therefore harder to
detect. Their current ability to operate in the low frequency domain does not allow for
early detection as compared to noisy previous generation Soviet submarines. This
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acknowledges the fact that acoustic signatures are difficult to see visually and hard to
analyze in a timely fashion. Additionally, classical submarine tactics are to remain
covert at all times. He has the advantage to maneuver into the
limiting-lines-of-approach of an oncoming battle group and await for his optimum
weapon release envelope. Once released, he has the ability to rapidly change depths
and achieve an evasive sprint speed to exit safely the area of conflict. Thus, for this
aspect alone, it is paramount that the ASWC acquire as early as possible, the presence
of an enemy submarine.
Flexibility is a key element involved in an ASW prosecution. The measure of
effectiveness of an ASWC is to be able to reevaluate past decisions and make a timely
adjustment to the current scenario as new information becomes available. Again,
ASW is not an exact science. Ambiguity and error probabilities are built into all
sensors and processing equipment. As prosecution continues, error refinement
becomes less and may change drastically the initial hypotheses. Recognizing this
potential, it is imperative that the ASWC possess the keen quality to reorient his
thought process and direct the new decisions where applicable.
True operational environments are extremely complex and not easy to function in
when conducting anti-submarine warfare. We have patterned the ASWC's decision
process and outlined many crucial areas where quick reaction is essential for battle
group survivability. To put this into perspective, it can be viewed as inference versus
choice.
Inference is concerned mainly with assessment of evidence related to the relative
likelihoods of various hypotheses being true, and the judgements being made are
usually in the form of probabilities. Although these probabilities usually enter into
the choice process, the distinctive feature ofchoice is the assessment of preferences
regarding the various options available, or the predicted consequences or outcomes
ofthese options. (Ref. 4:p. 25)
It is this reasoning that places an exorbitant demand on the ASWC to be precise and
react accordingly.
It can be seen that one decision alone can influence but will not solve an ASW
scenario. However, in the decision making thought process, inputs from an
experienced staff coupled with reliable sensor information, should enable an ASWC to
make the best tactical decision(s) given any ASW problem. A particular scenario can
not be considered ideal because there can be as many mitigating variables as there are
scenarios. Therefore, in order to justify and validate a model, the human decision
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making process must be examined. Once understood, realism can be achieved by
injecting into an ASWC model, state-of-the-art equipment currently available to the
decision maker (ASWC). Possessing these qualities, most submarine threat simulations
can be modeled. For any given scenario will accomplish the desired training results.
Whether it is one ship against one submarine or ten ships against one submarine, the
end result acts as a teaching aid to improve human reaction and efficiency, but at
different complexities respectfully. In support of this, the next chapters discuss




Decisionmaking is the art of choosing from a list of alternatives a choice that
will fulfill a given objective.
First, goals or objectives must be known or identified (if these are not present, there
is no motivation to decide or act). Secondly, current circumstances, insofar as they
are relevant to the achievement of a goal, are assessed. If a discrepancy is perceived
between goals and reality, options for action are generated. If more than one
option is available, a choice will be made. (Ref. 4:p. 1)
It is difficult to assess how and why people make decisions, for there are many times
that events occur in which everything is known and yet the decision itself, is hard to
make. This is a common occurence. However, some decisions are so complex in
nature, that a final course of action is extremely difficult or may in fact never be
achieved. The decision-maker must rely on his experience and understanding of
potential outcomes and uncertainties. Molded together, the decision-maker will make
a choice that is the proper solution to a situation according to his interpretation or
viewpoint.
Humans are constantly confronted with making decisions on a very frequent
basis. They can be simple in nature where most of the alternatives to choose from are
trivial. That is to say, the choice of action between two or more alternatives does not
present serious consequences, such as deciding what color shirt to wear with a pair of
pants. The ultimate choice is a human trait that is dependent on the decision-makers
personality. On the other hand, many decisions are very complex and may affect
people other than the decision maker. These decisions are usually made from
experience and are often found in most critical professions where the decision-maker
makes a choice inorder to ensure that the best possible solution is attained.
"Decision-making is therefore something which concerns all of us, both as makers of
the choice and as sufferers from the consequences, and there can be no doubt about
the importance of the subject." (Ref. 5:p. 1) This is particularly noteworthy, for an
ASWC makes decisions which can solely affect the outcome of the battle group
survivability, both in human life and equipment. This is extremely significant, for a
bad choice of action can easily result in the loss of naval vessels. Or perhaps, the
ASWC may be confronted with a decision that will lead to the sacrifice of several ASW
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units. This could be viewed in some sort of scenario exchange ratio, in which may
cause the cost of lives and/or equipment, but will eventually provide for an optimum
ASW solution. These types of decisions are not easy to make and require a
decision-maker who is trusted and highly regarded for his abilities to make sound
judgements. ' He may require immediate action without time to fully analyze the
alternatives despite the potential for enormous consequences. It is interesting to note,
that the final decision may in fact be driven by a "gut feeling" or the probabilities of
chance.
A. EXPERIENCE
A person from childhood through adulthood develops a behavioral pattern based
on their past experiences. These past experiences may be pleasant such as a happy
family reunion at Christmas or very traumatic such as putting a hand on a hot stove.
Whatever the case may be, each experience is registered and stored in the library of the
human brain. Although human experiences or events are all stored, they may not
necessarily all be remembered, Such forgotten events can be associated with a
particular number that gives the exact circumference of the planet Earth in feet or the
spelling of a Soviet Navy shipping seaport (e.g., Petropavlovsk). It takes several
rehearsals or memorizing in order to recall from memory. This feature of the human
cognitive system will be addressed in the next section commonly known as short and
long term memory.
Children in general, have a very brief past or library to recall from experienced
events. However, as the child approaches and enters into adulthood, he establishs a
foundation through past experiences that allow for rational decisions to be made.
Each experience becomes more and more influenced by effects of their previous
experiences. These experiences may not necessarily be related, but as events occur, the
adult acknowledges a new event and draws from his library of associated personal past
events to determine a logical solution to a problem. These influences are usually
additive. That is, each experience builds upon a prior experience and these coupled
together, provide for future justification in formulating decisions. "Cumulative
experiences leads to the emergence of progressively more complex, higher-order
accomplishments." (Ref. 6:p. 47) Although relative in nature, higher-order complex
accomplishments are many times associated with executive decision-makers. In
particular, an ASWC is a very good example to model the executive plaqued with
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crucial problems to be solved. For example, in a hostile environment, the ability to
recall past experiences from an ASWC's naval career, enables him to make the best
decisions based on those experiences.
B. SHORT AND LONG TERM MEMORY
Information enters the brain through short term memory. "Information entering
the short-term store is assumed to decay and disappear completely." (Ref. 7:p. 10)
Existing information in the short term memory is therefore transient and must be
constantly rehearsed in order to prevent its rapid decay. If the information is
continuously rehearsed, it will enter into long term memory. However, if the desired
information needed is recalled from long term memory, then the rehearsal acts as an
aid to reinforce the already known information. This reinforcement serves as a tool to
condition the human cognitive system and provides an asserting effect on future recall
of this information. The positive effect associated with rehearsal of long term memory
does enhance the speed and accuracy at which information can be recalled.
The rehearsal effect is in essence a learning process. What is learned or
memorized, is stored in long term memory. This is to say, that as an experience builds
upon another event(s), this event is being transfered from the library of the long term
memory. It serves as the registration and storage of past experiences and events, much
of which is the foundation of human knowledge. Additionally, long term memory
which is dissimilar to short term memory, has infinite storage. It acquires information
that has been sent from short term memory, catalogues and stores for future recall.
C. CHOICE TASK
"It is claimed that decision-making is more art than science and that intuition
and experience are the main resources of a decision-maker." (Ref. 8:pp. 3-4) This
analogy of decision-making reinforces the issue that emotions and human personalities
tend to drive the chosen alternative for a particular action. In general, a choice task
decision-maker has several options to follow which are different in many aspects. Each
of the alternatives can require different actions and yield totally different outcomes.
But of these alternatives, only a single solution must be selected. The thought of being
able to choose two or more possibilities in theory is feasible, but is not an option for
the choice task decision-maker. For this, a list must be made up of all the possible
available options. This list is very important and a key component for the
decision-makers. It is essential that the list be as thorough and complete as possible,
19
because its contents will hold all the choices for one to choose. Once complete, it is
then considered a valid assumption that all possibilities have been examined and the
list is complete and exhausted. Additionally, as the list increases in size, so does the
number of stimuli, number of possible outcomes and thus, the difficulty for the
decision-maker also increases and grows in complexity.
D. UNCERTAINTY
Uncertainty is also a key issue in the pursuit of attaining the best possible
decision. "The realization that decision-making involves a comparison of alternatives,
making it necessary to consider them, is, in itself, an advance. The realization that it is
necessary to consider the uncertainties that may affect the situation makes people
contemplate the outcomes of their decision-making much more carefully." (Ref. 5:p. 10)
Without doubt, it is a natural human reaction for a decision-maker to make a choice
from a list of alternatives and still possess some sort of uncertainty for the choice
selected. However, to assist the decision-maker, the exhaustive list that has been
created also serves as a tool to remove as much uncertainty as possible. Alleviating
such uncertainty can be accomplished by acquiring more information. This leads the
decision-maker back to the concept of information flow. It is imperative that
information be passed as accurately as possible. By ensuring the utmost accuracy,
uncertainty will be reduced. This is a major concern for the ASWC decision-maker.
Specifically, ASW as mentioned, is not an exact science. Critical decisions for battle
group survivability in an ASW threat environment, are dependent upon precise
information with as little uncertainty as possible.
The real difficulty in decision-making belongs in the uncertainty of the event(s)
being evaluated. Each uncertainty must be reviewed in depth prior to making a choice
or conclusion. For some alternatives hold various levels of uncertainty. At times,
uncertainty is combined and presented as an average such as surface ship sonar bearing
errors. It is common to classify such error as an averaged number. However, in
reality, bearing errors change under various acoustical conditions depending on the
oceans environment. Therefore, the choice task decision-maker must realize the type
of uncertainty when deciding on the optimum choice to the problem.
The above represents an overview of some of the more critical parameters that
contribute to the decision-making process. At times it may appear as if the
decision-making process was irrational. However, at the time the decision was
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assessed, the decision-maker may have been tired, over stressed, emotionally involved
in other problems, or a combination of any or all of these aspects. These are some
reasons why decision-making can be influenced by the human personality. On the
other hand, the influence of experience can be the key element to making a decision.
This is readjly seen in most people holding executive corporation positions, where
experience breeds success, power and money. For the ASWC, his ability to draw on
his own experiences, is what protects the battle group from the hostile submarine
threat.
Therefore, to model or simulate the intricacies associated with a decision-maker,
is very difficult, if possible. Validity is one of the most important constraints when
modeling a decision-maker in a real world environment. ALPHATECH, INC., has
developed such a way to approach a realistic ASWC decision-making model. This
model will be overviewed next, by presenting the important concepts used for its
development and subsequently its validation for real world applications.
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IV. ASWC SIMULATION MODEL
TheFe .has been a tremendous amount of effort dedicated toward developing an
ASWC simulation model. This model is to provide an ASW scenario for which an
ASWC can utilize to evaluate battle group survivability in a hostile ASW environment.
As we have seen, this is not an easy task to accomplish because of the countless
variables that can enter into a given ASW encounter. ALPHATECH, INC., has
developed such a simulation model. It enables an ASWC to make decisions regarding
enemy submarine locations from a battle group, given specific acoustical information.
As such, the model' provides acoustical data from underwater sensors and allows the
ASWC to decide on validity of the information and track the threat submarine with
respect to the battle groups position.
The rationale behind this concept is in fact a very good way to approach an
ASW scenario. Allow a decision-maker (ASWC) to absorb raw acoustical data,
formulate an opinion as to the submarines position and track its movement as
additional information is acquired. Additionally, the model must allow for the
decision-maker to change a course of action as new and more concrete information is
received. This is a good representation of a decision-maker and is one of the many
objectives confronted by an ASWC. Therefore, the model possesses validity only as
long as the received information supports current operational data and parameters
associated with available acoustical equipment present on board US naval warships.
A. ALPHATECH, INC., ASSESSMENT SCENARIO
The ASWC simulation model developed by ALPHATECH, INC., is designed to
model an ASWC's reaction in an ASW scenario. In order to justify the models
performance, US Navy personnel (referred to as subjects) were utilized. All subjects
had at some point in their career, a professional background in ASW. Additionally, all
subjects possessed a working knowledge of tracking submarines when given
bearing-only information. The results of the experiment using the Navy subjects would
later be matched against the models performance. "If it can be demonstrated that the
model has predictive validity, then construct validity can be demonstrated by showing
that the performance distributions for the model and the subjects arose from the same
underlying distribution." (Ref. 3:p. 23) Therefore, assuming that the subjects are truely
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experts in bearing-only convergence zone tracking and the model performance
corresponds to the subjects results, then validation has been demonstrated.
In order to assess the performance of the model, a data base of information
needed to be obtained. This was accomplished by giving each subject two ASW
scenarios. Both scenarios had common features, in that, the composition of the naval
vessels in the battle group were the same. For each scenario, the battle group was
heading due North at an advance speed of 15 knots. At different time intervals, the
subjects would receive a piece of acoustical information from a particular platform. It
is with this information, that the subject was required to determine what convergence
zone or how far away the submarine was from the platform. This was accomplished
by taking the raw data and plotting this information on a grid coordinate chart. The
subjects were also required to plot this acoustical data taking into account both, the
sensors bearing error and the vessels new location in the scenario. Table 1 below, gives
the battle group composition that each subject used (Ref. 3:p. 28). It also denotes




Platform Sensor Bearing Error
Submarine (SSN/DS) Towed-Array V-5
Frigates (FF) Towed-Array +/-5
Destroyers (DD) Sonar +/-10
Cruisers Sonar +/-10
Aircraft Carrier
Therefore, as each piece of information was acquired and plotted, the subjects
could trace the submarines track with respect to the battle group. Also, the
decision-maker (subject) could alter his thought pattern as the battle group advanced
in the scenario. If the decision-maker made a poor decision as to the position of the
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submarine, the subject could move the submarine to a new location without penalty.
For example, if the subject believed that the enemy submarine was in the third
convergence zone, but new information revealed a higher probability to be in the
second, then the subject could orient his thought pattern to the second convergence
zone. This is a very realistic and common approach quite often seen in the operational
fleet today. Until an ASWC can obtain an area of high probability, most of the
decisions are based on experience and his best guess as to the enemy submarines
position.
B. ALPHATECH, INC., KALMAN FILTER APPROACH
ALPHATECH, INC., approached the ASWC model by mathematically modeling
an ASW scenario. "With an appropriate model of a real-world situation, we should be
able to predict certain outcomes or determine how the real world would behave if we
implemented a particular alternative decision. In some instances, a model enables us
to select the best or optimal decision." (Ref. 8:p. 16) One such method of
mathematically modeling a real-world scenario and is used by ALPHATECH, INC., is
the discrete Kalman filter. In general, the Kalman filter procedure gives satisfactory
results, but there is evidence of erratic filter behavior. Therefore, when using the
Kalman filter, caution should be exercised when formulating the matrix. In particular,
there has been on occasion, premature collapse of the error covariance matrix, even
under favorable operating conditions. This aspect is not advantageous to the model
performance because it will ultimately cause the solution to diverge. Therefore, if or
when solution divergence occurs, target-motion-analysis (TMA) estimations by use of
the Kalman filter, can not always be guaranteed to be reliable.
The following discussion gives a description of the Kalman filter modeling
process combined with mathematical excerpts taken from the written drafts provided
by ALPHATECH, INC. Specifically, this discussion is on how they established the
criteria for utilizing the discrete Kalman filter. The results from using this established
criteria, has a very important and practical application. For, if the criteria is invalid,
then the model will represent and provide little useful information.
The state vector x(t), represents the state estimater or motion of a submarine
being tracked at time "t". It is assumed to be multivariate normal, with mean zero
(Nxl). The states of the track hypothesis over a period of time,At, is modeled by the
state equation:
x(t+dt) = <j>(t)x(t) + u(t),
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where (j)(t) is the (NxN) state transition matrix and u(t) is the white Gaussian noise
sequence matrix of zero mean with covariance Q(t). u(t) basically describes the
randomness of the system as it moves from state x(t) to x(t+ 1).
The measurement or observation equation, y(t), which is the sonar contact data,
is given by:
y(t) = Hx(t) + v(t).
The y(t) is the (Mxl) matrix of only sonar bearing data measurements. Additionally,
y(t) is the vector of measurements made at time At. The measurements are assumed to
be linearly related to the system state x(t) by the observation matrix H(t). H(t) is the
(MxN) measurement geometry matrix and v(t) is a (Mxl) white Gaussian noise vector
of zero mean with covariance R(t).
The between measurements on the basis of observations, provides an estimate of
the states of the submarines track hypothesis and is noted as x(t|t). This is the best
estimate given all measurements up to and including y(t) and has its covariance given




P(t+At|t) = <|(t)P(t|t)(j)(t)T + Q(t),
where the uppercase T, represents mathematically, the transpose operation.
When a measurement y(t+At) is obtained, the state and error covariance matrix
of the track hypothesis are updated and given as:
State Update
/
x(t+At\t+At) = x(t+Ai\t) + K(t+At) (y(t+At) - H x(t+At|t))
Kalman Gain
K(t+4t) = P(t+4t|t) H (H P(t+4t|t)HT + R(t+At))~
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Error Covariance Update
P(t+4t|t+/k) = (I - K(t+dt) H) P(t+^t|t).
The state update equation has several features worth noting. First, the (-Hx(t+^t|t)),
is the predicted outcome of the measurement and secondly, the (y(t+/\t)), is the actual
measurement. The two terms when combined together, yield the measurement residual.
The system model contains the state vector which is the Cartesian position and
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and the "Q" matrix allows submarine course and/or speed changes with "r ' being the





This is not the complete approach which ALPHATECH, INC., chose to follow.
For, the simulation model with all its various idiosyncrasies, would indeed have to be
inspected. However, the Kalman filter approach to simulate an ASWC's
decision-making process, is a very sound way to model such a task. The Kalman filter
procedure is in fact, commonly accepted as one of the prime means to attain
target-motion-analysis estimations and is one of the building blocks of this simulation
model. Further, to no surprise, "simulation modeling is one of the most widely used
techniques in operations research." (Ref. 9:p. 2)
Two issues need to be addressed regarding the experiment conducted by
ALPHATECH, INC. First, in the experiment, the ASWC (subject) received acoustical
bearing data information from the attack submarine operating in direct support
(SSN/DS). This is very possible by means of Probe Alert (underwater telephone) or by
means of a Slot sonobuoy ( a submarine launched prerecorded information sonobuoy).
However, this is very rarely used in fleet operational exercises and is highly unlikely to
be used in a hostile ASW environment. Secondly, the bearing errors associated with
the towed-array and sonars of +/-5 and + /-10 degrees are reasonably valid numbers.
More importantly, there should be a weighting factor associated with the information
received from these sensors. For a towed-array is more sensitive and an ASWC would
most likely focus his course of action from information received from this sensor.
The US Navy today, is constantly being updated in surface ship overhauls and
aircraft reworks in order to improve its capabilities in an ASW environment. For this
reason, the following chapter presents a discussion as to what new sensors and
equipment are available to an ASWC. This is a particularly important aspect when
modeling an ASW encounter or an ASWC's reactions. It has already been stated, that
a simulation model must represent the real world in order to be considered valid.
Therefore, for this issue alone, the next chapter is provided to enhance the validity of
the model presented by ALPHATECH, INC. If molded together, the model may in
fact, yield a true updated representation of an ASWC's operational environment and a
very useful model for training purposes.
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V. OBTAINING ASW INFORMATION
In a hostile anti-submarine warfare environment, acoustical information and/or
the enemy submarine location is extremely critical for the survival of a battle group.
For this reason alone, it is imperative that the ASWC be knowledgeable of all the
available assets by which he can obtain submarine information. Although, as we have
discussed, obtaining actual raw acoustical data, can be a very arduous task. In that,
open ocean water conditions can vary and the current generation of Soviet submarine
radiated noise levels have been significantly reduced and thus, sensor detection is more
difficult. The US Navy has recognized this new added dimension in the Soviet
submarine fleet. Therefore, considerable amounts of money, time and effort, has been
directed in upgrading the quality of existing shipboard acoustical decision aids to assist
the ASWC.
A. AN/SQQ-89
The advent of the Soviet submarine capability to launch cruise missiles against
surface platforms or carrier battle groups from long ranges, has placed new demands
on US war vessels to acoustically detect these enemy submarines at multiple
convergence zones. One such way of obtaining this acoustical data, is the new
integrated Antisubmarine Warfare Control System (ASWCS) or commonly known as
the AN/SQQ-89. This system is designed to detect, track, classify and localize multiple
underwater submarines at extended ranges. Up to and including current shipboard
Combat Information Centers (CIC's), ASW acoustical information has not been
centralized. The ASWC attains acoustical information such as sonar contacts, via
sound powered phones or loudspeakers. Raw data display is only attained by
physically going to the console itself. The AN/SQQ-89 alleviates this problem. All
system displays are centralized in CIC and allow the ASWC to simultaneously view all
incoming and historical sensor data. Additionally, this multi-sensor system
automatically provides the ASWC with an underwater torpedo fire control solution.
The AN/SQQ-89 ASW Combat System is comprised of the following system elements:
* AN/SQS-53B/C...Hull Mounted Sonar
* AN/SQQ-28 Sonar Signal Processing System
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* AN/SQR-19A Sonar Receiving Set
* SIMAS Sonar In-situ Mode Assessment System
* MK-116 ASW Control System.
Each of these elements can operate autonomously, but in doing so, the automatic
design features are lost. Thus, human interface is required to assist in data analysis
and operator expertise becomes a key factor for the ASWC when making ASW
decisions.
The AN/SQS-53B & C are basically an updated version of the existing
AN/SQS-53A hull mounted sonar. Specifically, enhanced transducer abilities permit
this sonar to extend its ping propagation to greater distances. It also provides for
improved return ping resolution despite the depth of the submarine. Lastly, this sonar
is capable of detecting, tracking and classifying submarines both actively or passively
unlike current generation hull mounted sonars.
The AN/SQQ-28 system is the Light Airborne Multi-Purpose System (LAMPS
MK III) helicopter shipboard data link receiver. It has and provides various functions
which spacially ties the helicopter to the ship via a two-way pencil beam signal.
Several of these key functions are:
1. Allows for two-way clear or secure radio communication.
2. Allows for two-way ESM contact information.
3. Allows for two-way air-to-surface radar coverage.
4. Simultaneously, process and displays raw acoustical data acquired from
helicopter sonobuoys.
The introduction of this system now enables the surface fleet to remain covert by
sending the helicopter well over the horizon. In doing so, the surface platforms or
battle group can extend its ASW operating parameters several convergence zones
farther away. Additionally, this tactic allows for extended ranges in ESM (Electronic
Warfare Support Measures) and surface ship surveillance from the aircraft radar
summary while remaining undetected.
The AN/SQR-19A is a Tactical Towed-Array (TACTAS) which is trailed
underwater, several thousand feet behind the ship. The lengthy trailing distance is
necessary in order to suppress its own surface ship generated noise. This new array
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contains 48 acoustical hydrophone beams. It is capable of detecting radiated noise
levels well into the low frequency spectrum domain and can passively detect, track and
classify enemy submarines through all ocean sound propagation paths. Additionally,
in view of the enhanced stability and sensitivity of this array, it changes the current
operational 'fleet sprint-and-drift tactics required by its former predecessors. In that,
the array can acquire and continuously maintain multiple contacts at excessive ship
speeds while being in the towed configuration.
The acronym SI MAS, stands for Sonar In-situ Mode Assessment System.
Basically, this system processes real-time ambient ocean water conditions transmitted
from a bathythermograph and/or environmental water conditions measured from the
AN/SQR-19A towed-array. Additionally, it has a comprehensive built in memory
library of previous environmental predictions for the current desired operating area of
the surface ship. The system will correlate the real-time raw data with historical data
and will provide to the ASWC, its best guess as to depth settings for the towed-array,
hull mounted sonar transducer depression angles and sonobuoy hydrophone depth
settings.
The MK-116 is the ASW Control System and Underwater Fire Control System.
However, there is one exception, the FFG-7 class ship, in that, they are configured
with a WAP (Weapon Assignment Panel). In essence, the MK-116 is the "brain" of
the AN/SQQ-89 system. It receives all information processed by the hull mounted
sonar, towed-array, and the shipboard LAMPS helicopter sonobuoy processor. It
correlates any or all of this acoustical data up to and including 99 different contacts.
It also provides multiple contact management whereby, it will identify and categorize
each contact as to its threat potential. Another capability of this system is its ability
to do target-motion-analysis (TMA). With this capability, it will maintain all historical
TMA information for three hours. This is a very beneficial aspect, for it plays a
significant role for the ASWC decision-maker when operating in a multi-threat
environment. One last key feature of the MK-116, is that it will evaluate the received
acoustical data and automatically provide a torpedo fire control solution for LAMPS
helicopter torpedo attacks and/or surface ship launched torpedoes.
The AN/SQQ-89 system in itself, is not a complete system that will be installed
in all surface naval warships. There exists four different variations to this system
depending on the ships class, taking into account the associated design mission task of
that ship. Table 2 presented on the following page, is a representation of each
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configuration package that will be installed onboard each ship class (Ref. 10:pp.
G-4,G-6).
TABLE II
VARIANCES FOR THE AN/SQQ-89
Variances For The AN/SQQ-89
DD(G)-963 FFG-7 CG-47 DDG-51
AN/SQS-53B AN/SQS-53B AN/SQS-53C
AN/SQR-19A AN/SQR-19A AN/SQR-19A AN/SQR-19A
AN/SQQ-28 AN/SQQ-28 AN/SQQ-28 AN/SQQ-28
SIMAS SIMAS SIMAS SIMAS
MK-116 WAP MK-116 MK-116
* DD(G)-963. . represents Spruance(DD) and Kidd(DDG) class
ships.
* FFG-7 represents the Oliver Hazard Perry class
ships.
* CG-47 represents the Ticonderoga class ships.
* DDG-51 represents the Arleigh Burke class ships.
The AN/SQQ-89 system is currently operational in both the Atlantic and Pacific
Oceans. Its presence alone, has significantly strengthened the ASW capabilities of the
surface battle group. For, real-time acoustical information, better computers yielding
faster iteration time and higher quality as well as more sensitive equipment, all play an
essential role in assisting the ASWC in his decision-making process. Furthermore, the
addition of the automated feature, reduces operator error and allows the ASWC to
evaluate his ASW course of action, based on his experience and a computerized
solution as to the submarines location.
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B. EXPERIMENTAL OVERVIEW
The experimental results from the ASW scenarios obtained by ALPHATECH,
INC., serves as a fundamental foundation for which subsequent data analysis can be
attained. The scenarios themselves, actually have little impact as to the significance of
the model. This is because the scenarios merely act as a teaching aid to assist the
decision-maker into formulating a course of action to follow. The ALPHATECH,
INC., modeled scenario does fulfill the requirements of modeling an ASW scenario and
does serve as a teaching aid despite its simplicity. It should also be noted, that
increased amounts of model complexity for which an ASW scenario possesses, is
probably a fair assessment of a potentially real hostile ASW environment.
Additionally, if the magnitude of complexity is increased, it can also serve as a very
good means by which to determine strengths and weaknesses of an ASWC
decision-maker under various conditions. For, operational ASW requires continuous
training, experiencing judgemental mistakes and/or acquiring a better perspective for
future avenues to follow built upon previous lessons learned.
The experimental parameters utilized by ALPHATECH, INC., need to be
reevaluated. Specifically, it does not truely represent a realistic representation of real
world ASW in a hostile environment. We have already stated, that without a realistic
representation, then the model loses its credibility and serves little to no purpose. The
following discussion is directed toward this aspect and discusses what is available in the
operational fleet today. This is not a complete discussion, because each battle group is
comprised of different surface elements. For example, some battle groups have a
battleship in lieu of an aircraft carrier and are commonly referred to as a Surface
Action Group (SAG). However, for discussion purposes, the already established
experimental battle group composition modeled by ALPHATECH, INC. (i.e., Frigates,
Destroyers, etc.), will be utilized with emphasis on the AN/SQQ-89 ASW Control
System.
Helicopters are a key element in any ASW encounter. Particularly, the LAMPS
ASW helicopter. Although, it is a single unit in itself, when airborne, it serves as an
extension to the surface ship by means of a two-way secure data link. It is capable of
earring 25 sonobuoys, two torpedos and can remain airborne for over four hours
without refueling. Additionally, if a refueling station is available, the LAMPS MK III
helicopter can remain airborne for 30 consecutive hours before coming to rest inorder
to perform required maintenance actions. These all weather aircraft are operational in
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the fleets today and operate ofT of the experimental battle group composition such as
frigates (FFG-7's) and destroyers (DD-963's). With the LAMPS aircraft capabilities,
surface ships are able to investigate ASW contacts or areas-of-probabilities easily into
a multi convergence zone environment.
The ALPHATECH, INC., ASW scenarios, begin with a detection of a subsurface
contact in the second or third convergence zone by a surface ships towed-array. As the
scenario developes, more information is attained by other ships hull mounted sonars or
towed-arrays and thus, the decision-maker developes a hypothesis as to the location of
the submarine. This is a very realistic assumption. However, the presence of the
AN/SQQ-89 and the LAMPS aircraft, has certainly added a new dimension to an ASW
scenario. Therefore, for the experimental scenario, if a submarine is believed to be
within several convergence zones, then the model should allow the ASWC to launch a
LAMPS helicopter for further investigation. This is a very common tactic used in the
fleet today. The principle component in any ASW scenario or submarine encounter, is
to detect the subsurface threat as early as possible and as far away from the battle
group as possible.
The current generation of Soviet submarines are capable of operating in the low
frequency spectrum where detection becomes extremely difficult. However, the new
AN/SQR-19A Tactical Towed-Array, is a far more efficient and sensitive array. This
new towed-array is capable of acquiring detection in the low frequency levels and at
farther convergence zone distances. Additionally, after initial detection, the surface
ship can make a course alteration thereby resolving any hydrophone ambiguity. This
procedure is vital, for resolved ambiguity leads to a better refined area-of-probability.
The enhancement of resolving bearing ambiguity significantly reduces the ASWC's
reaction time and allows for less error in localization. This important concept should
be incorporated into the ALPHATECH, INC., ASWC model because its increased
capability in assisting the ASWC's decisions as to the submarines location. Therefore,
in an ASW scenario, with a given AOP, the ASWC can launch his ASW LAMPS
helicopter for further prosecution in excess of 100 nautical miles from the battle group.
Acoustical hydrophone sensing equipment in the past, have many times been
positioned at less than optimum depths. However, SIMAS now provides the
decision-maker with optimum hydrophone depth settings utilizing both current and
historical acoustical environmental predictions. This new decision aid is very important
because it allows ASW helicopter flight crews to preset hydrophone settings based
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upon the environmental predictions. Once airborne, the helicopter does not have the
capability to alter the sonobuoy depth settings. Thus, if the submarine is operating in
the deep sound channel and sonobuoy settings are set for the upper surface layer or
vice versa, then acoustical detection is highly unlikely. This also holds true for
submarine radiated sound energy propagation for detection by the surface ship
towed-array. Another major feature of SIMAS, is that it provides the ASWC with the
best depth to trail the towed-array and optimum depression angles for the hull
mounted sonar. Although difficult to model, the ASWC model should require the
decision-maker to choose between shallow or deep hydrophone settings based upon
predicted environmental conditions. This added creation requires the ASWC to draw
on his knowledge of interpreting acoustical data predictions. Therefore, realism is once
again entered into the model in order to simulate a real operational atmosphere.
In a multi-threat environment, contact management is very cumbersome and
practically impossible without computer assistance. The MK-116 ASW Control
System possesses a built in storage memory that maintains target-motion-analysis on
multiple targets. This function is a tremendous decision aid for the ASWC, in that, the
ASWC can visually track the location of submarines with respect to the battle group.
Having this pictorial display, the ASWC can formulate his decisions for altering battle
group course and speed of advance as well as positioning his ASW surface assets in
order to obtain optimum ASW screening for the battle group. Additionally, the
MK-116 will give the ASWC a computerized torpedo fire control solution based upon
received acoustical data and target-motion-analysis of the submarine. This control
system has major significance for an ASWC when operating in an ASW hostile
environment. Therefore, for this reason, the real world simulation model should allow
the decision-maker to utilize this target-motion-analysis information as well as allow
battle group course changes away from the submarine threat.
Another key issue that has not been addressed at all, is the ASWC's availability
of acquiring intelligence information of recent Soviet surface and subsurface
movements. Usually, the ASWC will have the latest information as to the general
location and hull class type of Soviet submarines believed to be operating in his
vicinity. Vicinity here, can mean as much as 1000 square nautical miles. Although,
this can encompass a large area of ocean, it does serve as a warning tool to assist the
ASWC in possibly verifying a submarine contact. It also enhances the human
operator's performance because he is alerted to a potential frequency band which can
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be associated with the submarine threat suspected in the vicinity. The ALPHATECH,
INC., model blindly places a battle group progressing along a given track and suddenly
submarine contact information is acquired. Real world operations usually do not
support this blind assumption. A submarine detection may come as a surprise, but its
potential existance would normally be known. Therefore, the ALPHATECH, INC.,
decision-making model should provide the decision-maker with advanced knowledge
and potential locations of any hostile submarines. This is not always a guarantee, but
it does provide the necessary stimulus for an ASWC to be aware of his threat
environment. Armed with this information, it will allow the ASWC to match his
acoustical knowledge, threat knowledge and experience to validate a submarine
signature. Thus, battle group orientation and decisions to dedicate which surface
and/or air assets against specific submarine contacts, becomes a realistic scenario.
The topics discussed above reveal in a broad sence, where the US Navy's
capabilities are today and provide some in-sights as to its future course of direction
with regard to combating the ASW problem. ASW is fascinating in nature and quite
unique, in that, no two scenarios are alike. ASW modeling, requires complete
understanding of the variables which can significantly alter an encounter. The model
must also be able to adjust to the human decision-making process. There are no
concrete s>tep by step solutions to any given ASW scenario because of the constantly
changing environmental conditions. Therefore, it is essential that the model design
parameters must be related to actual specifications or equipment available to real life
situations.
The real world ASW problem has been receiving a tremendous amount of
attention and will continue to do so, now and in the future. One such way of looking
at the problem is to devise a simulation model. A model that reflects a realistic
approach to a true operational environment. Thus, as circumstances change or
techniques become improved, the simulation model must also be upgraded to reflect
these alterations.
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VI. THE ASWC DECISION-MAKER
Thus far, this study has introduced several issues that confront an ASWC. They
range from knowing the enemy threat and its capabilities to some of the facets that
effect a decision-maker. The latter, requires further amplification with respect to
modeling an ASWC. The ASWC decision-maker model developed by ALPHATECH,
INC., is a representation of one approach to modeling an ASWC decision-maker. In
doing so, they justified their decision-maker's ability to react in an ASW environment,
by means of an ASW tracking scenario. Specifically, a subject received bearing only
information from a naval vessel at a particular time and position. At subsequent time
intervals, an additional piece of bearing information would be received and thus, the
subject would attempt to track the submarine contact utilizing this bearing only
information.
This concept of modeling an ASWC, does constitute a valid representation of an
ASWC decision-maker; however, there are other aspects to the decision-making
scenario that need to be examined. Several of them have already been addressed, such
as, the use of ASW helicopters. This added feature alone, could drastically influence
an ASWC's decision-making process. This is not to say that the approach
ALPHATECH took was wrong, but it does point out that it falls short of accurately
representing a real world operational environment. It represents only a small portion
of what actually evolves in an ASW encounter. It is the nature of these key issues and
there resulting impact, that will significantly effect or alter an ASWC's perception
and/or reaction. Therefore, an opposing viewpoint is provided to enhance the
understanding of an ASWC. To do this, a conceptual model of an operational ASWC
is furnished in an effort to support this viewpoint.
The chosen way to present a discussion of these arguments is by means of an
example. This example, as demonstrated in the following figure, is a snapshot picture
of a generic carrier battle group transiting through an open ocean. It is designed to
enhance credibility, by pictorially mocking a typical battle group with its associated
ASW assets.
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Figure 6. 1 Carrier Battle Group.
= Aircraft Carrier
X = ASW ship with towed-array and hull mounted sonar
[Tl = ASW LAMPS helicopter
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Before we subject the ASWC to a potential submarine contact, we need to
momentarily digress and revisit an important topic; the presence of intelligence. In
general, an ASWC will have knowledge of submarines operating in the proximity of his
transiting . path. In particular, he receives a continuous update of the various
submarine class hulls by type and by last known operating areas. This information is
critical because detected submarine frequency signatures can be compared to those
identified in the intelligence reports. The importance here, is that if there is a
correlation between the two, then an ASWC will undoubtedly regard this as a valid
contact. Thus, his decision process in classifying the contact, is cluttered with less
uncertainties. On the other hand, if the signature does not correspond to known
intelligence, he may make the assumption that it is a false contact or a potentially valid
contact that did not appear in the intelligence reports. In lieu of the latter, it may
serve as the triggering spark in his decision-making process for further investigation.
Whichever is the case, an ASW scenario is born.
Having addressed the decision applications associated with intelligence, we now
must conceptually look at the ASWC in his decision-making method when acoustical
contact information is acquired. In particular, we are interested in how he values or
weights information from his sensors. In some cases, the decision can be very easy,
such as, visual sighting of a submarine, which is not an uncommon occurence. Or it
can be quite difficult, especially if two or more sensors report contact information on a
specific contact, but for some reason, they are not reporting the contact in the same
location.
To put a weighting factor on a particular sensor, can be a confusing and rather
difficult task because a particular sensor may not be at its peak performance. To
expand on this issue, if a trailed towed-array has its very low frequency (VLF)
hydrophone beams inoperative, then that frequency domain of potential information
will not be available to the sensor operator or the ASWC. Loss of this valuable
frequency spectrum will certainly pose a major problem on the ASWC decision-maker
in his performance of ASW. He may perceive this sensor casualty as a major
degradation and thus, it will carry an insignificant weighting factor. The counterpoint
to this issue, is that when the towed-array is fully functional, the ASWC may value this
as his primary sensor when making his decisions. Therefore, a dilemma exists. That is,
he may regard a VLF degradation, as say, 20% probability of detection (Pd). On the
other hand, if the towed-array is fully functional, it may carry a weighting factor of
100% Pd.
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To complicate matters even further, we can address the same example but with
two sensors. If under normal circumstances, an ASWC entrusts 100% Pd in attaining
acoustical information from a fully functional towed-array and only say, 50% Pd from
a hull mounted sonar in the passive mode, then the weighting factors of 100% and
50% respectively is conceptually established. If he acquired contact information on his
hull mounted sonar, then he places a 50% probability on that particular information
with respect to it actually being a valid contact. However, returning to our example, if
the towed-array becomes degraded in the VLF domain, then he will orient his
weighting criteria from 100% to 20%. But, for the hull mounted sonar, he may
conceptually elevate his weighting factor from 50% to say, 80% Pd. This increased
weighting factor, presents an interesting aspect. With the major degradation in the
towed-array, he may determine that his hull mounted sonar is the only fully reliable
sensor available. Therefore, lacking reliable towed-array information, he will place
higher emphasis on the sensor that is fully functional. Thus, with greater emphasis
focused on the hull mounted sonar's ability, then correspondingly, there will be an
increase in its weighting factor.
Now that we have demonstrated by this rather simple example, how an ASWC's
decision-making process can easily be influenced by equipment malfunctions, we can
readily note the amount of difficulty behind modeling an ASWC decision-maker. For
ease of future discussions, the assumption will be made that there are no sensor
degradations. Although, it is important that the reader keep in mind, that sensor
equipment degradation and/or total failure, is a very common occurence.
Referring back to the pictorial example, there exists ships having towed-arrays,
hull mounted sonars and an ASW LAMPS helicopter airborne. The airborne
helicopter does not serve in the capacity of a search vehicle, because it is regarded as a
reactionary asset. The ASWC can not disregard this airborne helicopter, for he is
responsible for providing airspace flight safety. Additionally, the ASWC is not
concerned with attaining acoustical information from the helicopter, because no
sonobuoys have been expended. This leads to the sole reliance of acquiring submarine
contact by means of his surface ship's towed-array and/or hull mounted sonar.
Acknowledging this, the weighting factor must be brought back into play because the
ASWC is confronted with which of the two sensors are the best element to procuring
acoustical information.
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The advent of the AN/SQQ-89 system into the fleet today, has brought
significant changes that affect an ASWC's decision-making process. Not only is it an
integrated system that also has the ability to operate autonomously, but the significant
advantage gained, is that it incorporates the latest in state-of-the-art technology. In
particular, the towed-array hydrophone sensitivity with associated computer support
equipment, can easily detect submarine frequency signatures beyond multiple
convergence zones. This enhanced asset alone, makes the AN/SQR-19A towed-array,
the primary sensor that an ASWC utilizes. Although the hull mounted sonar has been
improved in the AN/SQQ-89 system, it currently can not achieve (under other than
ideal water sound propagation conditions) the detection distance as compared to the
newly advanced towed-array. Therefore, an ASWC places a very high weighting factor
on the towed-array for initial detection.
Once an initial detection has been made, the ASWC will attempt to ascertain if
other units attained the same contact. If not, he may be faced with the decision to
relocate other units with the idea of acquiring a two sensor fix and thus, a localized
area of probability can be achieved. Another aspect along this line of thought, is that,
the ASWC is not only attempting to gain a fix, but once achieved, he wants to ensure
that he maintains contact. This brings about various considerations that he needs to
decide upon. If he changes the integrity of the ASW battle group screening, he may
leave a void in its protection. On the other hand, the change may enhance the
situation by refining the location of the datum. How he arrives at this decision is a
judgement call. However, it can not be taken lightly and must be carefully evaluated.
He may be increasing his vulnerability and thereby, inviting potential disaster.
Following the discussion previously presented, the ASWC has an additional
hurdle for which a decision needs to be made, in that, he still has an airborne ASW
asset that is available for utilization. If he does elect to send the helicopter to the
datum, he is confronted with several decisions that also need to be considered. These
may encompass the amount of fuel onboard, launching a second helicopter or the time
and distance to datum that the helicopter would need to travel. Therefore, as an
ASWC decision-maker, he is confronted with several issues all at once, that require his
attention. It is a multi-dimensional problem. Once initial contact is attained, his
thought process is moving ships, helicopters or a combination of the two. Confronted
with all of these thoughts, he also is simultaneously considering the tactical
advantages/disadvantages, safety factors and potential repercussions once his decision
is executed.
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Along with these considerations, another topic is worth examining. Utilizing the
pictorial example, the environmental surroundings need to be discussed. The ASWC
must rely upon his experience and acoustical background knowledge, as he determines
how to effectively deploy his sensors. If deployed improperly with known water
conditions, detection may not occur. For this reason, it is imperative that he possess a
keen understanding of how sound propagates in water. For optimum deployment
results, he must decide upon whether towed-arrays should be trailed deep, shallow or a
mix of the two. Additionally, this also affects the helicopter. Once airborne, sonobuoy
depth settings can not be altered. These are important issues, for if detection from a
deep trailed towed-array is acquired and the helicopter has only shallow setting
sonobuoys, then he has lost a valuable asset for attaining acoustical information.
Fortunately, the AN/SQQ-89 system has SIMAS incorporated. This decision aid is of
invaluable assistance to an ASWC. Its data bank of historical acoustical predictions
coupled with, real time acoustical data obtained from a bathythermograph, gives an
ASWC a "best depth" setting for deployed sensors. Thus, combining results from
SIMAS and his own environmental predictions, he must decide upon the optimum
tactical deployment of his sensors.
There exists one last aspect that affects the ASWC decision-maker. This being,
how he perceives the effectiveness of his personnel. This perception, is determined by
various inputs, such as, effectiveness of training, personalities, fatigue, attitudes and
professionalism. Without adequate training, the overall readiness of an ASW asset is
degraded. If morale is low, personnel attitudes will be affected and performances will
decrease. If operators are fatigued due to excessive job demands, then this also
decreases their abilities to function in stressful situations. Additionally, the ASWC
may favor a particular ship or flight crew because of there stronger professional
abilities. Perceptions acquired from these sort of issues, drive an ASWC to formulate
opinions that may carry a significant value or weighting factor. This will become
evident, when he makes decisions that require involvement of ASW assets in a
scenario.
We have discussed several topics that affect an ASWC's decision-making process.
Specifically, intelligence, equipment casualties, the various ramifications associated with
positioning and/or reorietation of ASW assets, environmental considerations with
regard to acoustical predictions and some of the problems associated with his
personnel. Taking each issue separately and allowing an ASWC to make a decision
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based upon that issue, is a conceivable task to analyze. However, to tie all of these
together and link them to an ASW scenario, is a very difficult task in itself, let alone
attempting to model. But, this is the reality that an ASWC must regularly deal with.
When making his decisions, he must mold all of these issues together in order to
formulate the best possible course of action to follow. The following figure represents
how this decision-making process can be conceived. In that, an ASWC receives
various inputs that may occur at the same time and yet, the result is one decision.
\7
Figure 6.2 Decision-Making Process.
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We have also discussed the topic of a weighting factor. Each issue presented, has
several internal elements to which an ASWC places emphasis upon or
increased/decreased significance. This may vary with the current state of the
operational environment and/or the readiness capabilities of his ASW assets. In
addition to this, he places a weighting factor on each one of these major issues. For
example, if he is involved in tracking a submarine, he may place less emphasis on
intelligence and a higher concern on reorienting his ASW assets. Thus, depending
upon how much he weights each issue, directly reflects on how he makes his decisions.
This conceptual ASWC is a unique individual that is solely responsible for the
ASW posture of the battle group. In an ASW encounter, we have seen by this
discussion, that the ASWC is continuously overwhelmed with various problems that
are different in nature, but, all of which tie together. Thus, utilizing his knowledge,
experience and expertise, he makes the critical decisions that result in the survivability
of the battle group.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This study has identified the Soviet submarine ASW threat capabilities that can
be confronted in a hostile environment. Soviet launched cruise missiles, torpedoes and
quiet submarines all demonstrate that a potential threat does exist and should not be
taken lightly. To counter this, rigorous fleet battle group exercises must be continued
in order to maintain the skills necessary for detecting, localizing and destroying the
enemy submarine force. This particular aspect takes time, money and numerous
manhours to accomplish. Further, surface ships need inport time to rework casualty
components as well as crew shore leave for morale purposes. Therefore, other means
to train key personnel in the field ofASW is essential.
ALPHATECH, INC., devised one such approach by simulating an ASW scenario
and allowing an ASWC to track submarine targets, given certain pieces of information.
Specifically, the ASWC received acoustical bearing information from surface ship hull
mounted sonars and towed-arrays and submarine towed-arrays. Equipped with this
information, the ASWC then performed submarine target-motion-analysis using a grid
lock coordinate system. This is a good way to model an ASW scenario. It keeps the
ASWC decision-maker constantly aware of his profession while preserving the
reactionary skills of an ASW threat encounter. However, to ensure that the
preservation of this proficiency is maintained, the ASWC model must support real
world conditions that are available in an operational ASW arena.
The following recommendations are submitted in order to enhance real world
conditions to the ALPHATECH, INC., ASWC decision-making model.
1. Provide the ASWC with some sort of intelligence. Give potential submarine
threats operating in the vicinity of the battle group. Include frequency and
harmonics associated with the threat submarine hull class. This acoustical
information should be related to components that usually generate and dissipate
detectable radiant noise (i.e., turbine generators, propulsion blade rates, etc.).
Although a new field under investigation, artificial intelligence may be an
alternative feasible input to give to the ASWC.
2. Provide acoustical environmental predictions to the ASWC prior to
commencing the scenario. This will satisfy the use of SI MAS and will allow the
ASWC to formulate his thoughts as to optimum depth settings for towed-arrays
and air launched sonobuoys.
3. Remove from the existing scenario the use of a Direct Support Attack
Submarine (SSN/DS). In almost all cases, they operate independently from the
battle group. Having them provide information is not a realistic parameter
primarily due to the loss of maintaining a covert posture.
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4. US submarines operate well in advance of a battle group. Before the simulated
scenario begins, the ASWC should be aware of the sectors for which each
submarine is operating within. This is normally called the "no-tack" submarine
area. This designated no-tack area, establishes the boundaries within which no
weapons can be launched due to the possibility of the contact being a friendly
submarine.
5. Incorporate the LAMPS MK III ASW helicopter into the model. They
currently operate off of FFG and DD class ships and are used extensively as the
prime tool to extend the battle groups ASW capabilities easily into multiple
convergence zones. Additionally, extended ASW coverage is significantly
increased if more helicopters are used.
6. When utilizing the LAMPS MK III ASW helicopter, the ASWC will be
concerned with placement of sonobuoys. A good mathematical model to do
such is the least squares passive tracking algorithm. This time based algorithm
can provide for how a sensor can be placed ahead of where the contact is
expected to be at some time in the future. It also will give how an aircraft
should be vectored in degrees true and for how far in nautical miles.
7. Give the ASWC the flexibility to alter the course of the battle group. This is
especially critical in an operational environment when a submarine is detected.
ITa submarine is going to attack using torpedoes, it must fire with the surface
vessels within the Timiting-lines-of-approach. Therefore, an ASWC will usually
alter the main body of the battle group away from the firing envelope of the
submarine.
8. Another motive for altering a surface ship is to resolve any bearing ambiguity
and to refine the area-oT-probability of the submarine contact. Once a
detection occurs, the ASWC should be able to orient another surface vessel
using its own sensors, to determine the contacts position. If a cross fix results,
then aircraft should certainly be launched to attain pin-point localization.
9. All ASWC's are qualified Surface Warfare Officers (SWO) with a US Navy
designator of 111(T. Therefore, when seeking out a data base to validate the
decision-making simulation model, the results should come from subjects with
this background. Additionally, these subjects should be graduates of the
Surface Warfare Officers Department Head School with an Operations
Department specialty, located in Newport, Rhode Island. These individuals
have had extensive training in ASW and are usually designated Tactical Action
Officers (TAO's) and are graduates of the TAO school. Thus, for data
collection based on knowledge and experience, these expert Navy specialists can
provide the necessary foundation to justify the validity of the simulation model.
10. The MK-116 ASW Control System should be incorporated into the model to
assist the decision-maker. It can provide target-motion-analysis on multiple
contacts, but more importantly for this model, it absorbs all real time data from
all sensors and gives the ASWC a computerized solution to where the contact is
located with respect to the battle group.
11. The scenarios given to the subjects for data base collection were very basic.
The Navy subjects are knowledgeable, experienced and operate efficiently in a
high tense A$W environment. Therefore, increase the complexity of the
scenarios. Make the subjects think. Use their unique expert talents to attain
the desired experimental results. Thereby, the collected data base becomes a
very sound foundation to reflect upon for model verification.
This study has discussed many of the problems associated with an ASW
confrontation. The flow of acoustic information can be distorted because of the
problems associated with the man-machine interface. However, the advent of the
AN/SQQ-89 significantly reduces this operator error. Also, the human
decision-making process has several unique behavioral characteristics which rely on
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knowledge and experience. These elements are affected by uncertainty and the ability
to recall upon past experiences to make a logical choice between several alternatives.
These alternatives may be simple in nature or very critical, such as the survivability of
a battle group, which lies solely on the course of action chosen by the ASWC.
Therefore, a, simulation model must possess flexibility and acknowledge that human
decision-making can at times be confusing for the decision-maker may be choosing a
course of action on mere instinct.
The Kalman filter approach that ALPHATECH, INC., utilized to
mathematically model an ASW scenario was a very good choice. It does not give a
perfect solution, but it does produce satisfactory results and is probably the best
technique available to predict outcomes given several alternatives.
The ALPHATECH, INC., simulation model is a good decision-making model. It
allows for an ASWC to track a submarine by means of a scenario with given pieces of
information. Although, some of the existing parameters are unlikely to occur in a real
world operational environment such as, submarine towed-array information. But it
does serve as a training aid to enhance an ASWC's efficiency. This is especially true if
the model reflects real world conditions. Therefore, given the recommendations
presented earlier, if incorporated, then perhaps a viable justification for the models
validity exists. Additionally, if the model represents a real world environment, then this
should satisfy the requirements to model an ASWC's decision-making process. Thus,
the objects and goals established by ALPHATECH, INC., to mathematically model an
ASWC's decision-making process, has been attained and should be utilized as a fleet
input to train Naval Antisubmarine Warfare Commanders.
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